It is argued that there are interesting cases in which two axiomatic systems syntactically and semantically non-trivially different in the standard sense are rather to be classified as only trivially different. For a strict comparison of the systems of such a kind the generalized concepts of syntactically and semantically trivial differences are formally defined. As an example, it is shown that an instant-based time system and a period-based time system sketched in the paper are just trivially different in the defined sense in spite of the fact that, contrary to Quine's famous requirement, the variables of the two systems can never range over the elements of one and the same basic set. What is the same in relation to both systems is time topology.  2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
By comparing first-order axiomatic systems according to Quine's semantical formula 'To be assumed as an entity [. . .] is to be reckoned as the value of a variable' [17, p. 13] , one should say that two axiomatic systems not interpretable in such a way that variables of one of them and the variables of the other one range over the elements of one and the same basic sets are both syntactically and semantically non-trivially different.
However, there are interesting cases in which two systems different in the cited sense are more naturally to be taken as only trivially different. That's why more generalized concepts of syntactical and semantical differences are needed. It will be shown of what importance they can be for comparing rival ontologies.
1.
Let us consider two simple first-order systems S 1 and S 2 . S 1 contains x 1 and x 2 as the only two individual variable symbols and = as the only relation symbol. S 2 contains y 1 and y 2 as the only two individual variable symbols and D as the only relation symbol. Let the elementary wffs of S 1 be x 1 = x 1 , x 1 = x 2 , x 2 = x 1 , x 2 = x 2 and the elementary wffs of S 2 be Dy 1 y 1 , Dy 1 y 2 , Dy 2 y 1 , Dy 2 y 2 , the complex wffs being introducable in an obvious way by adding logical constants and quantifiers. Let the axiom scheme of S 1 be (x n )¬x n = x n (n = 1, 2) and the axiom scheme of S 2 be (y n )¬Dy n y n (n = 1, 2) (in addition to the axioms of propositional and predicate calculi). S 1 and S 2 are syntactically only trivially different because there is a set of syntactic constraints, C, which provides a translation of each wff of S 1 into just one wff of S 2 , and vice versa, such that each theorem of S 1 is translated into just one theorem of S 2 , and vice versa. (If the two languages in which S 1 and S 2 are formulated are not to be mixed, all wffs of one of the two systems should be replaced at the same time through the corresponding wffs of the other one.)
In view of the intended generalization, it should be noted that the mutual interchangeability between all the wffs of S 1 and all the wffs of S 2 is based on a 1-1 mapping of each variable symbol of one of the two systems to a variable symbol of the other one, say of x 1 to y 1 and x 2 to y 2 , so that the base for the recursive definition of all syntactic constraints providing interchangeability can be introduced as x m = x n = C Dy m y n (m = 1, 2; n = 1, 2), = C meaning that the formulae flanking it on each side are interchangeable under C-constraints (translation rules).
From a semantical point of view, S 1 and S 2 are equivalent in relation to the two respective classes of their models, because each relational structure that is a model for S 1 is a model for S 2 , and vice versa. Now, the interesting cases we are looking for are those cases in which there is no such thing possible as a complete mutual translatability between the wffs of two (complete firstorder) systems S and S based on one set of syntactic constraints alone, but where there are still two recursively definable sets of mutually non-inverse translation rules C and C * (based on mappings of each variable of S to just one variable tuple of S and of each variable of S to just one variable tuple of S), such that all the wffs of S as well as all the wffs of S are translatable according to C and C * respectively, the theorems being always translated into theorems and non-theorems into non-theorems. A concrete example will be formally elaborated in Section 2. In this section shall cite the necessary and sufficient conditions that are to be met in relation to any two complete first-order axiomatic systems containing denumerable infinite sets of variables if the systems are to be understood as syntactically and semantically trivially different in a non-standard yet generalized sense, which doesn't mean that the same idea is not naturally extendable to other kinds of systems too. Supposition 1. Let L be a family of complete first-order languages, each of the languages containing a set of individual variable symbols and predicate/relation symbols in addition to logical constants and quantifiers.
Let us pick out from L a pair of languages, L and L , whose respective sets of variable symbols are V = {v 1 f is a 1-1 mapping of each variable symbol of L to a (k + 1)-tuple of variable symbols of L , whereas f * is a 1-1 mapping of each variable symbol of L to a (l + 1)-tuple of variable symbols of L (k > 0, l > 0), namely:
C is a set of syntactic constraints, related to f , defining a 1-1 translation of each wff from F into a wff from F in a standard recursive way so that for each i and F i ∈ F :
for some F j ∈ F , where 
. . , f (v n+p q )) denotes some F j from F which contains all and only variable symbols from the tuples to which the variable symbols from F i are mapped according to f ; • = C connects F i and F j by stating that F j is to be taken as just that wff which is obtained from F i according to C.
• The set of syntactic constraints C * , providing a translation of each wff from F into just one wff from F , is to be understood analogously to C.
It is important to notice that, since f and f * are mappings of variable symbols to (k + 1)-tuples and (l + 1)-tuples, where k 1 and l 1, the translations under C and C * are translations of all the wffs from F into (not onto) F and of all the wffs from F into (not onto) F respectively, C and C * being necessarily non-inverse. Supposition 2. Let two axiomatic systems S and S be built up by introducing two sets of axioms A and A into L and L respectively, both A and A containing as their proper subsets all axioms of the propositional and predicate calculi. (The derivation rules are supposed to be standard derivation rules of the propositional and quantification calculi.) Let it be supposed that under f , f * , C, C * from Supposition 1 each theorem of S is translated into a theorem of S as well as each theorem of S into a theorem of S and that no non-theorem of S is translated into a theorem of S as well as no non-theorem of S into a theorem of S.
If Suppositions 1 and 2 are satisfied, a curious situation arises. Although not all of the wffs from F are obtainable from F and not all of the wffs from F are obtainable from F under the two sets of translation rules, F contains as its proper subset all the wffs from F translated into F , and F contains as its proper subset all the wffs from F translated into F , the theorems always being translated into theorems and the non-theorems into non-theorems. But, however curious this can be, it is the latter fact, and not the former, that seems decisive for classifying S and S as syntactically only trivially different systems (in the generalized sense), vindicating the following definition: Turning to the question of interpretation of systems S and S syntactically trivially different in the generalized sense, one should notice that (1) although variables of one of them can range over the elements of the basic set in no model of the other one and although syntactic constraints C and C * are not inverse, (2) S is interpretable under C in any relational structure (if there is any) in which S is satisfied as well as S is interpretable under C * in any relational structure (if there is any) in which S is satisfied. Now, is it the former fact (due to which the Quinean slogan is not satisfied) or is it the latter one that is to be taken as decisive for the question of whether two systems syntactically trivially different in the generalized sense (according to Definition 1) are also to be taken as semantically only trivially different (in the generalized sense) in relation to the respective classes of their models? The answer to this question seems to require some kind of informal philosophical argument, which is going to be dealt with in Section 3. At this stage we shall simply classify such systems as semantically trivially different in the generalized sense in relation to the respective classes of their models, where the qualification 'in the generalized sense' is to be understood technically, as meaning just that each of the two systems syntactically trivially different according to Definition 1 is always interpretable in a corresponding model of the other one after an appropriate translation. Therefore: Definition 2. Two systems having models and being syntactically trivially different according to Definition 1 are semantically trivially different in the generalized sense in relation to the two respective classes of their models.
It is easy to see how the standard conception of syntactically and semantically trivial differences related to the first-order systems can be obtained as a special case when only Supposition 1 is slightly changed as to be satisfied under syntactic constraints which are inverse, the translations of all the wffs of L into wffs of L and of all the wffs of L into wffs of L being then 1-1 mappings of F onto F and of F onto F respectively. Actually, k and l from the above definitions of f and f * should be taken to be equal to zero.
2.
The importance of the above generalizations will be now illustrated with an intriguing example concerning 'the great struggle' about the structure of time, 1 one of the two parties holding instants, the other one periods as its basic stuffs. 2 For the sake of simplicity I shall use the axiomatization whose models are perfect but not coherent sets in Cantor's sense 3 .
Let S P contains-besides logical constants ¬, ⇒, ∧, ∨ and ⇔-individual variable symbols α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n , . . . (n = 1, 2, . . .) quantifiable by universal and existential quantifiers. The variables are supposed to range over durationless pointlike instants. Also let S P contain relation symbols ≡ and <, to be interpreted as identity and precedence relation respectively 4 . Let elementary wffs be α m ≡ α n and α m < α n (m = 1, 2, . . .; n = 1, 2, . . .) and the axiom schemes of S P be (in addition to the axioms of propositional and quantificational logic):
.).
Let S I contains-besides logical constants ¬, ⇒, ∧, ∨ and ⇔-individual variable symbols a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n , . . . (n = 1, 2, . . .) quantifiable by universal and existential quantifiers. The variables are supposed to range over time-intervals with duration (periods). Also let S P contain relation symbols =, ≺, , ∩ and ⊂ , to be interpreted as identity, precedence, abutment, overlapping and inclusion relation respectively. Let elementary wffs be a m = a n , 1 A 'great struggle' ('ein großer Streit') is Cantor's expression that he used for characterizing the rivalry between the two approaches related to the question about continua in general (cf. [10, p. 190] 1, 1001 b 7] ), the period-based approach dominated until the second half of 19th century. After Dedekind and Cantor, the situation has changed radically, so that now the period-based approach has still been considered revisionist (see [4, p. 2] ), in spite of a number of articles favouring this approach (cf. [7] [8] [9] [13] [14] [15] [16] [18] [19] [20] ). In view of what follows, the 'great struggle' should be considered trivialized (at least as concerning the structure of pure time-see Section 3) in relation to any given time topology whatsoever. 3 I take 'coherent' to be the best translation of 'zusammenhängand' in the context of Cantor's definition of continuum (see [10, p. 194] ). 4 In view of the aim to question the mentioned implication of Quine's semantical formula, the two systems that are to be compared are not sketched as propositional tense logic where the instants and periods are confined to metalanguages (as in [15, [18] [19] [20] ), but in such a way that variables are directly interpretable as ranging over the sets of two related sorts of entities (as in [7] [8] [9] 13, 14, 16] ).
a m ≺ a n , a m a n , a m ∩ a n , a m ⊂ a n (m = 1, 2 . . .; n = 1, 2, . . .).
In view of what follows, it is, however, to be noted that , ∩ and ⊂ , although introduced as primitives for the sake of a conventional characterization of period-based time structures 5 as well as for the sake of generality, are definable (at least in view of the system we are here interested in) via = and ≺ in the following way:
Now, let in addition to the axioms of propositional and quantificational logic, the axiom schemes of S I be:
(A I 1) (a n )¬a n ≺ a n ; (A I 2) (a k )(a l )(a m )(a n )(a k ≺ a m ∧ a l ≺ a n ⇒ a k ≺ a n ∨ a l ≺ a m ); (A I 3) (a m )(a n )(a m ≺ a n ⇒ a m a n ∨ (∃a l )(a m a l ∧ a l a n )); Proof. Let us check (A I 1). (a n )¬a n ≺ a n would not be satisfied in , = * , ≺ * , * , ∩ * , ⊂ * only if there were x i , x j , x i ≺ * x j , so that x i , x j ≺ * x i , x j . However, this means, according to the above definitional equivalence concerning x i , x j ≺ * x k , x l , that it should be x i ≺ * x j ∧ (x j ≡ * x i ∨ x j < * x i ), which is impossible, because ¬(∃a m )(∃a n ) a m < a n ∧ (a n ≡ a m ∨ a n < a m ) , and P , ≡ * , < * is supposed to be a model for S P .
It can be shown in a similar way that each of the axioms of S I is satisfied in , = * , ≺ * , * , ∩ * , ⊂ * , where for the axioms (A I 2), (A I 3), (A I 4), (A I 5) and (A I 8) the cited definitions of , ∩ and ⊂ are to be used in addition to the definitional equivalences concerning = * , ≺ * , * , ∩ * , ⊂ * . 7 given that
and
. . , α n , . . . ranging over the elements of , and ≡ and < being interpreted as ≡ * and < * respectively.
Proof. The proof is mutatis mutandis the same as the proof of Lemma 1. ✷
Metatheorem 1. S P and S I are syntactically trivially different in the generalized sense.
6 Due to the fact that the elements of the basic set of a model for S I are 'stretches' that can be treated as 'intervals between distinct points' only if they are not conceived as sets of points but as something unequivocally defined by pairs of distinct points, it would be misleading in the given context to conceive periods (as in [11, 12] 7 The two related systems being complete, the checking of the axioms suffices.
Proof. Let
f : α n → a 2n−1 , a 2n (n = 1, 2, . . .), f * : a n → α 2n−1 , α 2n (n = 1, 2, . .
.).
Let syntactic constraints C 1 -C 5 and C * 1 -C * 5 , providing a 1-1 translation of the set of all the wffs of S P into a subset of wffs of S I and the set of all the wffs of S I into a subset of wffs of S P respectively, be defined as follows:
, where ♥ stands for ⇒ or ∧ or ∨ or ⇔, and F P and F P stand for two wffs of S P translated according to C 1 -C 5 into two wffs of S I , C(F P ) and C(F P ) respectively,
where F P is a wff of S P and C(F P ) is the wff of S I into which F P is translated according to C 1 -C 5 when the structures of F P and C(F P ), indicated in the parentheses, are such that:
• Q 1 and Q 2 stand for quantifiers, • F P S stands for a wff of S P containing α n and α m and being translated according to C 1 -C 5 into wff C(F P S ) of S I containing a 2n−1 , a n , a 2m−1 and a 2m , • ϕ, χ , ψ stand either for nothing or for quantified variables and/or wffs of S P translated according to C 1 -C 5 into C(ϕ), C(χ) and C(ψ) respectively, • ω stands either for nothing or for a wff of S P translated according to
, where ♥ stands for ⇒ or ∧ or ∨ or ⇔, and F I and F I stand for two wffs of S I translated according to C * 1 -C * 5 into two wffs of S P , C * (F I ) and C * (F I ) respectively,
where F I is a wff of S I and C * (F I ) is the wff of S P into which F I is translated according to C * 1 -C * 5 when the structures of F I and C * (F I ), indicated in the parentheses, are such that:
• Q 1 and Q 2 stand for quantifiers, • F I S stands for a wff of S I containing a n and a m and being translated according to C * 1 -C * 5 into wff C * (F I S ) of S P containing α 2n−1 , α n , α 2m−1 and α 2m , • R, T , U stand either for nothing or for quantified variables and/or wffs of S I translated according to C * 1 -C * 5 into C * (R), C * (T ) and C * (U ) respectively, • W stands either for nothing or for a wff of S I translated according to C * 1 -C * 5 into C * (W ). Now, it can be shown that according to C 1 -C 5 each axiom of S P is translated into a theorem of S I . This time, let us check (A P 2). C(A P 2), according to C 2 , C 4 and C 5 , reads as follows: −1 )(a 2n )(a 2m−1 )(a 2m )(a 2k−1 )(a 2k )(a 2n−1 a 2n ∧ a 2m−1 a 2m 
By using Lemma 1, it is easy to see that if C(A P 2) were not a theorem, there would be some y r , y s , y t , y u , y v , y w in a model for S I so that y r * y s , y u * y t , y v * y w , y r ≺ * y t , not y r * y t , y u ≺ * y w , not y u * y w . However, this means, by assuming that such a model for S I is constructed on the base of a model for S P in the way in which it is done in Lemma 1, that in that model for S P there are pairs of elements x r 1 , x r 2 , x s 1 , x s 2 ,
which are ordered by < * and which correspond to y r , y s , y t , y u , y v , y w respectively, so that x r 2 < * x t 2 , x t 2 < * x v 2 , x v 2 ≡ * x w 1 and not x r 2 < * x w 1 , which is impossible due to the fact that (A P 2) is satisfied in each model for S P .
After proving, in a similar way, that according to C 1 -C 5 each axiom of S P is translated into a theorem of S I , it is easy to see that C(F P i ) for each i such that F P i . Namely, due to C 3 and C 4 , the sameness of the general structures of F P i and C(F P i ) guarantees the corresponding applicability of modus ponens, whereas, due to C 5 , substitutions, generalizations and instantiations related to α n in a proof for F P i should be simply followed by the application of the corresponding rules related to a 2n−1 and a 2n in the corresponding proof for C(F P i ).
Having proved that according to C 1 -C 5 each theorem of S P is translated into a theorem of S I , it is still to be proved that no non-theorem of S P is translated into a theorem of S I . Now, the two systems being consistent and complete, not F P i entails ¬F P i for each i.
Therefore, C(¬F P i ), and so not C(F P i ).
What is proved, with the use of Lemma 1, for translations governed by C 1 -C 5 , can be proved mutatis mutandis, by using Lemma 2, for the translations governed by C * 1 -C * 5 , which means that S P and S I are syntactically trivially different in the generalized sense. ✷ Proof. The statement of the metatheorem follows directly from Definition 2 and Metatheorem 1. ✷ 3. The same formal system can be given completely different interpretations (e.g., it can be about lines, atoms, people, etc.). A fortiori, two syntactically only trivially different systems need not be semantically trivially different in relation to two respective interpretations. So, even if one is convinced by the reason cited in Section 1 that the two systems S P and S I sketched in Section 2 are to be classified as syntactically trivially different (in the generalized sense), he can still doubt that S P and S I , when interpreted as an instant time system and a period time system respectively, should be considered as semantically trivially different (in the generalized sense, too). In particular, he could argue that the two intended models for S P and S I are just as relevantly different as intended models for any two respective systems of two obviously different interpretations, because instants are not periods and periods are not instants. So, he could conclude, after all, that though S P is interpretable in the corresponding period time-structure after it has been translated into S I and S I is interpretable in the corresponding instant time-structure after it has been translated into S P , we should not classify S P and S I as semantically trivially different (in the generalized sense either).
If we want to avoid begging the question in this discussion about the philosophical plausibility of generalizing the semantically trivial difference, technically introduced by Definition 2 in Section 1, we need further, independent arguments.
On the one hand, the instant-based time ontologists can say that the time model for S P should be accepted as the intended time model for S I too, because periods, formally defined in Lemma 1 in Section 2 as ordered pairs of two distinct instants, are nothing else but relations between two instants. On the other hand, the period-based time ontologists can say that the time model for S I should be accepted as the intended time model S P too, because instants, formally defined in Lemma 2 in Section 2 as ordered pairs of two equivalence classes of abutting periods, are nothing else but relations between abutting periods. The point is that according to the instant-based time ontology we do actually speak about instants and their relations when we speak about periods and their relations while according to the period-based time ontology we do actually speak about periods and their relations when we speak about instants and their relations.
The difference between the 'nothing-else-but'-claims of the instant-based time ontology and the period-based time ontology would we annihilated through the 'as-well-as'-claim stating that we speak also about periods and their relations when we speak about instants and their relations as well as we speak also about instants and their relations when we speak about periods and their relations. According to the 'as-well-as'-claim, the time model for S P should be accepted as the intended time model for S I too, and also the time model for S I should be accepted as the intended time model for S P too. Now, I want to argue that Definition 2 in Section 1 is also philosophically vindicated, because the 'as-well-as'-claim is always plausible ceteris paribus. The argument is simple and not circular. If two systems are mutually translatable according to Definition 1, all statements about a model for one of them are expressible as statements about the corresponding model for the other one and vice versa, so there can be no inherent reason favouring one of the two formulable 'nothing-else-but'-claims over the other. If two related 'nothing-else-but'-claims are formulable in relation to two corresponding relational structures but neither of the claims is favourable, then the corresponding 'as-well-as'-claim is vindicated. If the 'as-well-as'-claim is vindicated, the intended model for one of the two corresponding systems is also the intended model for the other one and vice versa. If the intended model for one of the two corresponding systems is the intended model for the other one and vice versa, then the two systems are semantically trivially different.
The method used in defining the time model for S I in terms of a time model for S P and vice versa can be applied to other time systems, independently of whether the time is conceived as discrete, dense or continuous, open or closed, branching or not branching, finite or infinite. 8 It is only the general applicability of this method by constructing a pair of systems trivially different in the precisely defined generalized sense that vindicates van Benthem's proclamation that 'systematic connections between point structures and period structures enable one to use both perspectives at will' [5, p. 84] . So, if the idea of syntactically and semantically trivial differences is applicable in these cases too, it can be said that what is the same in relation to any two time axiomatiozations that are trivially different in the generalized sense is time topology. If so, it is this invariance in view of topology that could be said to represent the positive account of the trivialization of the semantical differences between the corresponding systems.
Consequently, one might expect that the 'great struggle' between the instant-based and period-based ontologists will turn out to be 'much ado about nothing'. However, it must never be forgotten that the 'as-well-as'-claim is plausible with certainty only under ceteris paribus clause. For instance, one can wish to extend two systems, supposedly trivially different in the generalized sense, by introducing predicates denoting some external properties attributable to instants and periods. Now, even if interval predicates in one of the two systems and instants predicates in the other one are definable via instant predicates and interval predicates respectively, it doesn't follow that the resulting systems are such that the idea of trivial differences in the generalized sense is extendable to them. 9 The general lesson is that the answer to the question of whether the difference between two axiomatized rival ontologies, or two formal theories in general, is to be considered inessential or essential does not depend on whether the variables of the two systems can ever range over the elements of one and the same basic set or not, but rather on the applicability of the concept of the syntactically and semantically trivial differences in the generalized sense.
